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Abstract 
Time, data and memory trade off attack is one of the most important threats against pseudo- 
random generators and resisting against it, is considered as a main criteria of designing such 
generators. In this research, the pseudo-random GMGK generator will be addressed and 
analyzed in details. Having indicated various weaknesses of this generator, we performed 
three different versions of structural attack on this generator and showed that proposed 
TMDTO attacks to this generator can discover blocks of plaintext with lower complexity 
than exhaustive search of space of key generator. Results indicated that the mentioned 
generator is lack of the security claimed by authors.  
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1. Introduction  
Today, satellite and cellular communication networks and internet play a main role in 
providing global universal computation and communication. Based on this, using 
communication tools in most cases resulted in sensitive and important data to be saved and 
accessed and transferred which in turn makes privacy security as a main issue in those 
networks. While several researches has been performed in fields like cryptography, 
security protocols and standards to access to secure communication tools and 
proportionate to application, there are problems in this regard yet to removing of which 
appropriate solutions must be devised.  
Sequence codes is one of symmetrical cryptography algorithms that is highly important 
because of unique capabilities in communication and telecommunication networks like 
internet and GSM. Stream ciphers are used to make secure and verify electronic data 
transmission and are generally include a pseudo- random generator that generates a 
sequence of pseudo-random numbers or bits. For example those numbers, have been used 
in fuzzy cellular machines based on random numbers generators in [MSRB15].  
Recently, several researches have been performed in field of pseudo-random generators in 
particular chaotic pseudo-random generators and various designs have been proposed. For 
further studies on design and security of chaotic generators see [AL06]  ،  [PP10]  ،  [FGBE13] 
and [K16]. 
Structural attacks are those attacks that don’t concern the nature of cipher and its internal 
components and finds its weaknesses just through unique links among its inputs and 
outputs. Consequently, new information is detected on secure key or plain text. Time, 
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memory tradeoff attacks TMTO are common structural attacks on symmetric ciphers. 
Those attacks are implementable in known (chosen)-plaintext attack model and known 
(chosen)-cipher text attack model, if available under certain conditions. One of the methods 
to reduce time of exhaustive key search attack in stream ciphers is TNDTO attack that 
enables the attacker to tradeoff optionally time, memory and data resources required for 
this attack together based on an equation named TMTO curve and as a result simplifies the 
attack. After Hellman proposed general principles for block ciphers [He80], several studies 
have also been performed on stream ciphers to adjust or generalize it. Those researches are 
best exemplified by works including results obtained by Babbage on stream ciphers [B95], 
Golic on A5 stream ciphers [G97], two considerable papers by Biryukov [BS00] and Biryukov 
et.al. introducing TMDTO attack and attack to A5/1 [BSW00], Dawson et.al., evaluating LILI-
128 [DGMS00], Saarinen’s work to attack LILI-128 [S02], Hong et.al., introducing new 
applications of TMDTO [HS05], Babbage et.al., for evaluating MICKEY [BD06], and 
Dunkelman et.al. [DK08], for introducing role of IV in TMDTO attack. Readers are 
recommended to study Krhovják et.al. In [KSN11] for quick review on theory and 
application of TMDTO attacks to stream ciphers. 
This paper focuses mainly on the structural attack to a pseudo-random generator and is 
presented as follows. In Section 2 a new generator will be briefly described proposed in 
[GMGK16] after providing a general definition of pseudo-random generator. Also some of 
its most important weaknesses will be pointed out. Next three sections deal introduction of 
the three different structural attacks, particularly TMDTO briefly and then several attacks 
to the generator will be explained. The paper will be ended proposing summary of result 
and conclusion.  
 
2. Summary of pseudo- random generator GMGK 
Generally, a pseudo-random generator (statefull and synchronous) is generally shown by a 
quadruple ( , , , )X S n where X is space of input and output alphabet, S is the internal state 
space, : S S X   is the generator function (state transition) and n is the maximum 
number of output blocks for the generator (fig. 1) and is defined as[K16]:  
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In this generator during initializing step, the initial state 0s is calculated with a function 
Init  selecting secure key Key and a known initial value. Then, transition function for 
generator state ( )z according to definition is iterated for producing bn blocks of key stream 
sequence tz . In a stream cipher, a block of cipher text is generated by combination of a 
block of plaintext and a block of key stream. In most cases of structural attacks to stream 
ciphers, the state transition function ( )z or composite function ( )z Init   is considered as 
one-way function that must be inversed.  
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Figure 1: overview of a pseudo-random generator [K16] 
 
 
 
2.1. A brief overview of GMGK and its main components  
Gaeini et.al. have recently proposed a chaotic pseudo-random generator [GMGK16] (in this paper it 
is referred to as GMGK). This generator uses a 128 bits secure key ( )Key , an initial value of 128 
bits ( )IV , and a 128 bits internal state ( )L and includes a linear shift register, 3 linear congruence 
generators (5,1) and 3 chaotic generator called Tent(1.2), and Logistic (1.3) and Chebyshev (1.4.). In 
congruence generators ( 0)t  and in chaotic maps ( 0)t  , it was assumed that:  
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In case of GMGK, pseudo- random numbers are generated in two steps. Those numbers are 
generated in the first step will be used as input of second step (fig.2).   
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Fig 2: overview of GMGK generator [G16] 
 
First step of algorithm is based on linear congruence generators and chaotic maps while the 
second step of algorithm is based on shift register whose feedback is formed in each step 
using algorithm of first step. In following sections, we will call the first step algorithm as 
setup algorithm and the second step algorithm as the generator algorithm. The structure of 
setup algorithm is as follow. Its input contains three values:  
1. One 128 bits  Initial value ( )IV  
2. One 128 bits key ( )Key  
3. Three initial values of chaotic maps used in (1.5) 
In setup algorithm, the value of 128 bits ( )IV is encrypted as the plaintext block with 
( )Key by AES and the block of output cipher text is considered as the initial state ( )L of shift 
register. From this time on, AES is not used elsewhere. Three initial values of chaotic maps 
according to (1.2), (1.3) and (1.4) are entered in chaotic generators and generate three 
pseudo-random (chaotic) bits of   0
tentb  ،
0
lob and
0
chebb .  
To calculate (1.6), the initial value
1
0Z  has been determined as first 32 bits,
2
0Z  as the second 
32 bit and 
3
0Z as the third 32 bits of ( )Key  and numbers 
1 2 3, ,
t t tZ Z Z are generated according to 
(1.5). Then, values of 
1 2 3 4, , ,
t t t tP P P P are obtained based on (1.6).  The symbol ( )n  introduces 
n shift bits to right. In the following section, an output bit is generated according to (1.7) 
that makes the output sequence (key stream) of the generator algorithm.  
 
Bit generator 
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In (1.7), ( )tiLSB Z indicates the lowest value bit in 
t
iZ and [ ]
t
iL P indicates the bit value that is 
internal state of L in t
iP -th position. The output value of the generator algorithm, ( tz ) is the 
final generated bit that is added to the right side of internal state L  when the generator 
algorithm is executed and consequently the last 128 bits are considered as a new internal 
state. This process continues to have all bits of key stream to be generated. After all stream 
key sequence is generated, the first L bits of it (that has been generated once by AES) will 
be disposed. Together with initial values of chaotic map, ( )Key  is transmitted to the 
transmitter through a private channel and ( )IV is transitioned through the public channel 
at first of key stream to enable the receiver to decrypt data.  
 
2.2. The main weaknesses of GMGK 
Weaknesses of this generator are classified into two classes; weaknesses of chaotic 
generator and structural weaknesses:  
 Failing to use standard discretization method in chaotic map that causes the resulted 
sequence to lose its chaotic properties (random) after a short term [K16].  
 Uncertain bit size of initial values of chaotic map used in setup algorithm for the 
receiver that makes calculation of key length difficult.  
 The computational accuracy of machine when calculating values of chaotic 
sequences isn’t expressed explicitly that makes decryption difficult.  
 Size of IV is smaller than 3/2 of Key size that indicates the generator isn’t able to 
resist against TMTO attack [DK08].  
 Size of ( L ) isn’t bigger than ( Key ) that indicates the generator acts weak against 
TMTO attack [G97].  
 
3. Types of structural attacks to current ciphers 
The basic idea of these attacks is belong to Hellman and has proposed two decades ago for 
block ciphers [He80] that generalized by Biryukov and Shamir proposed to stream ciphers 
in [BS00] and they called it TMDTO. The basic idea in this attack is that the adversary 
attempts to find a one-way function and a heuristic method to inverse it effectively and to 
reduce time complexity for discovering secure key. This attack is always performed in two 
steps as offline (pre-processing) and online (main). In case of stream ciphers, the pre-
processing step first calculates the output corresponding to a number of inputs of one-way 
function and then these pairs of inputs and outputs are saved in a relatively large table. The 
time and memory of preprocessing step is not important and is generally neglected. Then 
in the main step, the adversary searches the output which is obtained from a small piece of 
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real key stream sequence to find at least one of the saved outputs. As a correspondence is 
detected between real output of the generator (key stream sequence) and one of 
predetermined outputs, the input related to this output is obtained from table and the 
adversary is allowed to generate complete output key stream sequence of the generator 
and to discover remaining blocks of plaintext using sequence of cipher text blocks. Before 
studying proposed attacks, we introduced some notations which are used in this paper in 
table 1.  
Table 1: notations  
Concept  Symbol  
Concerned one-way function  f 
Size of search space  N 
Time of execution of pre-processing step  P 
Memory of execution of pre-processing step M 
Number of f  outputs owned by the adversary D 
Time needed for executing the main step T 
 
Babbage, Golic, Biryukov and Shamir have used separately TMDTO attack for a pseudo- 
random generator in a stream cipher. In this attack, they all have considered a function that 
maps the internal state space of the generator on a piece of key stream sequence. Having 
inversed this function, they discovered main part of the plaintext. The important notes of 
TMTO curve and related conditions in these attacks are presented in table 2. 
  
4. First proposed attack  
In case of GMGK, the size of internal state is equal to the size of secure key. In various 
researches this weakness have considered as one of insecurity factors against a TMDTO 
attack. We used this weakness to implement our first proposed attack. Now we describe 
the attack scenario.  
Let 
128{0,1}S   is the set of possible states of GMGK and :f S Y is a function that maps 
each state of S  to the first 128 bits of a key stream sequence produced from that state.In the 
preprocessing step, the adversary wishes to generate a large table in two columns (of 128 
bits) and m    rows (table 3). In order to create each row, it selects a 128 bits randomly (or 
intelligently in some of advanced methods) as an internal state value of GMGK and places 
it in first column ( i
s
) and then 128 times executes function f  iteratively on it to generate an 
output of 128 bits (key stream sequence). It places the output in the second column 
0 127i i
y b b
and saves in the table in the ascending order of outputs. In the main step, 
(supposing that secure key is fixed) the adversary has D  pieces of a real key stream 
sequence and searches for similar piece for each of them in second column of table 3. 
Provided that D  and m  are large enough, regarding to the birthday problem, the attack 
success probability will be large and increasing number of columns of this table will 
increase this probability. In case that it succeeds to find such piece it will determine the 
internal state corresponding to it as the targeted internal state and using it and repeating 
iteratively f can generate rest of bits of key stream. Consequently, it will discover a large 
part of plain text blocks.  
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Table 2: The important notes of previous attacks 
Size of a sample value suitable 
on TMTO curve 
TMTO curve and 
 related conditions Reference  
T M D N   
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Table 3: generated memory during preprocessing step 
0 127i i
y b b is i  
1y 1s 1 
2y 2s 2 
    
my ms m 
 
In the main step, (supposing that secure key is fixed) the adversary has D  pieces of a real 
key stream sequence and searches for similar piece for each of them in second column of 
table 3. Provided that D  and m  are large enough, regarding to the birthday problem, the 
attack success probability will be large and increasing number of columns of this table will 
increase this probability. In case that it succeeds to find such piece it will determine the 
internal state corresponding to it as the targeted internal state and using it and repeating 
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iteratively f can generate rest of bits of key stream. Consequently, it will discover a large 
part of plain text blocks.  
Based on ideas discussed by Biryukov and Shamir in [BS00] , this attack is possible with 
TMTO curve
2 2 2TM D N . Regarding the value of 
1282N  and 3rd row of table 2, 
complexity of the abovementioned attack can be seen from 1st column of table 6. As seen, 
all resources of attack are separately smaller than search space of secure key. It indicates 
that the mentioned generator lacks 128 bits of security claimed by authors. 
5. Second proposed attack  
While Values of complexity obtained in the first step are smaller than that of exhaustive 
search of secure key space, it is probably impossible functionally. Because of this, we 
describe a second attack to GMGK generator. Biryukov, Shamir and Wagner indicate a 
weakness related to Rivest sampling method in TMDTO attack and proposed a new 
sampling method (BSW method in this paper) [BSW00]. In this method, each of outputs of 
the one-way function with a certain state (e.g. starts with k zero bits) is called special 
output and the internal state corresponding to it, is called special state. Its idea was to 
restricting the memory of preprocessing step to special states and outputs so that in the 
main step it was sufficient that only these outputs to be examined. Therefore, memory and 
time required for preprocessing and main attack time used to decrease with a known 
factor. They found that because the internal state in most of stream ciphers changes slightly 
after each output bit generated, this type of attack succeeds more likely, in practice. 
Babbage and Dad in [BD08] used this type of attack.  
Let
128{0,1}S   be the set of all possible states of GMGK and :f S Y   where 
S S  andY Y  , and  S    is the set of those 128 bits which their least significant 64-bits are 
different.  
In the preprocessing step, the adversary also wishes to generate a large table consisting of 
two 128 bits columns and m  rows (table 4). But instead of random selection of 128 bits as 
the internal state of GMGK i
s
, the adversary here just generates those 128 bits which their 
least significant 64-bits are different and then executes function f  128 times iteratively on 
each of them to generate a 128 bit output 0 127i i
y b b 
 and saves in the table in the 
ascending order of outputs.  
Since each internal state of GMGK generator, shifts one bit left side in each cycle and the 
generated bit is added to its right most place, it is seen that each two sequential states have 
a set of common 127 bits and also each 128 sequential states have at least a set of 64 
common bits, so it will be sufficient to save an index member of each set to reduce the 
search memory and time. Thus, our second attack will decrease time and memory of 
preprocessing step of attack with a reduction factor of
82R  .  
Suppose the adversary have  D  pieces of a real key stream sequence in this step, so in the 
main step, she seeks for each of them a target state in table 4. Again provided that D and 
m  are large enough, regarding to the birthday problem, the attack success probability will 
be large and increasing number of columns of this table will increase this probability... If 
the adversary could find such a piece, she will be able to find a target internal state form 
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table 4 and using it she can generate remaining of the real key stream sequence  by 
repeating iteratively f and finally discovers the main part of plaintext as a result. 
 
Table 4: generated memory during preprocessing step 
0 127i i
y b b  i
s i  
1y 1s 1 
2y 2s 2 
    
my  ms  m 
 
The second proposed attack is practical based on BSW sampling method. Regarding one of 
sample points of this curve with values contained in 5th row of table 2, the complexity of 
the abovementioned attack can be observed in 2nd column of table 6.  As seen from table 6, 
all used resources of the attack are separately smaller than the size of search space for 
secure key of GMGK and they indicate that the mentioned generator doesn’t have 128 
security bits that claimed by authors.  
 
6. Third proposed attack  
This section deals third proposed attack to GMGK and will be discussed in two steps. Let 
:f S S be one-way function and the adversary wishes to make its inverse from 1i
s   to i
s
.  
In the preprocessing step, if the adversary has 2
log N
bits of a real key stream sequence, 
then she will be able to search for one of intermediate states of the generator in the state for 
known plain text [BSW00]. Supposing that 1 j
b b
 is a piece of real key stream sequence, 
the adversary creates a table in preprocessing step and occupies m input state i
s
 and 
calculates  with a known value IV  and a large number of random keys Key , their 
corresponding 1is   output states saves in the table in the ascending order of outputs.   
 
Table 5: created memory in preprocessing step 
 i iu f s i
s i  
1u 1s 1 
2u 2s 2 
    
Du Ds D 
   
M Du  M Ds  M D 
   
Mu Ms M 
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In the main step, the adversary has a real key stream sequence of  2log 1D N  bits. She 
considers each piece of 1 j
b b
from this sequence (called a window). Then she considers 
1 ju u  in table 5 and compares theirs corresponding output bits with 1 j
b b
. 
Since conditions of the proposed attack conforms to conditions of the 3rd column of table 2, 
the adversary will be able to find at least one window coinciding to sequence 1 j
b b
. 
Having find this window and referring to table 5, the adversary achieves the state placed in 
1st row of this window which is her target state.    
The third proposed attack is practical with TMTO curve
2 2 2TM D N . The complexity of the 
attack is seen from 3rd column of table 6 regarding 5th row in table 2. The attack time 
complexity is considerably lower than that of exhaustive search of key space and thus is 
considered as a successful attack. It can be indicated that if size of input data doubles (key 
stream sequence ) then time complexity of the preprocessing step will decrease to half and 
complexity of processing step to quarter.  
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
This paper evaluated and analyzed the GMGK pseudo-random generator in details. We 
indicated weaknesses of this generator as well as three versions of different structural 
attacks to it and indicated that proposed TMDTO attacks to it can discover a large part of 
the plain text with lower complexity compared to exhaustive search of key space which in 
turn demonstrates that the mentioned generator lacks the security claimed by the authors. 
Table 6 summarize results of data, memory, and time complexity for three above proposed 
attacks. It allows the reader to use one of those methods to attack this generator 
proportionate to his or her resources and computational tools.  
 
Table 6: complexity of proposed attacks 
3rd attack  2nd attack  1st attack Parameter  
1282  1282  1282  N  
482 482 42.62 P  
642 522 85.22 M  
322 402 85.22 D  
642 402 42.62 T  
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